学术活动：香港中文大学高超禹副教授—The Qualcomm Case: A Supply Chain Perspective on Reverse Licensing Practices and Its Implications

讲座题目：The Qualcomm Case: A Supply Chain Perspective on Reverse Licensing Practices and Its Implications

讲座时间：2024年5月29日（周三）9：45-10：30

讲座地点：明德楼503会议室

主讲嘉宾：高超禹副教授 　 香港中文大学

主讲嘉宾简介：

高超禹目前是香港中文大学的副教授。他在2005年和2007年分别获得香港中文大学的工商管理学士学位（保险、金融与精算分析）和哲学硕士学位（经济学）。2012年，他从波士顿学院获得经济学博士学位。毕业后，他加入新加坡国立大学经济系，担任助理教授。他的研究重点是博弈论、产业组织和政治经济学。他的研究成果已发表在Canadian Journal of Economics, International Economic Review, Games and Economic Behavior, Journal of Economic Theory, Journal of Economic and Management Strategy, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Theory and Decision等经济学顶级和权威期刊上。

讲座主要内容：

We study the market impacts of a dominant upstream firm signing a compulsory zero-royalty cross-licensing agreement with all downstream competing producers. Such a business strategy, known as reverse licensing, allows the upstream firm to extend its market power to the downstream innovation and product markets. While reverse licensing promotes product competition (static efficiency) but hinders innovation competition (dynamic inefficiency), it generally raises the upstream firm's profit, but lowers downstream producers' profit, consumer surplus, and total welfare. A remedy that requires the upstream to pay offsetting royalty reduces inefficiency in innovation market thus always better for consumers and efficient downstream firms but worse for inefficient downstream firms. Interestingly, the upstream firm can also benefit if downstream firms are sufficiently asymmetric. While this paper extends the classical complementary inputs problem to a vertical setting, it also provides a theoretical framework to evaluate the influential antitrust case of Qualcomm and the remedy enforced by China's competition authority.

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经济学院

2024年5月27日